Commentators view the fragmentation of regulatory authority as a challenge to addressing economic issues within countries. As economic externalities and fi nancial crises extend transnationally, the issue of the regulatory alignment of transnational legal orders (TLOs) deepens. There is some literature on the fragmentation of international law and the rise of regime complexes in international relations (Raustiala & Victor 2004 ; Koskenniemi 2006 ) . But there has been little study of how different legal orders align and the implications of such alignment for national, transnational, and global social order.
legal norms and associated organizations and actors that authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions (Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1 ). Because every cross-border sale of goods, outside of barter, involves both a movement of goods and a payment of money, these two orders intersect. This interface poses challenges for the coordination and settlement of two distinct areas of international and national law and policy, governed by two different international organizations that work with different government departments, which in turn are staffed by professionals who have different disciplinary backgrounds and policy priorities and who are pressed to be responsive to different economic constituencies.
2 This chapter assesses the implications of the coordination and alignment of these two legal orders for legal ordering across three important issues confronting the world economy today.
A primary function of the two peak organizations of the international monetary and trade legal orders -the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) -is to ensure global economic order through law and institutionalized cooperation . In the 1940s, the founders of the IMF and the GATT wanted to move the international economic system away from what they viewed as the " desperate tactics of the past -competitive currency devaluations, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple currency practices and unnecessary exchange restrictions" (U.S. Department of State 1948 : 1226). As set forth in Article I of the IMF Articles of Association, the "purposes" of the IMF are "to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution," "facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of trade," "promote exchange stability," "maintain orderly exchange arrangements among members," and "avoid competitive exchange depreciation." In parallel, the purpose of the GATT and of its successor, the WTO, is to facilitate agreement among its members for a liberalized trading order and to oversee, monitor, and facilitate the maintenance of such an order, including through peer review and legalized dispute settlement.
One could imagine these different, but complementary, functions -fi nancial stability and trade liberalization -addressed within a single international organization, which was in fact contemplated following the model of the League of Nations (Dubin 1983 ). In the Bretton Woods negotiations, however, the parties decided to create two separate organizations -the IMF and an International Trade international fi nancial law covers a broader range of fi nancial transactions across borders, including harmonized and coordinated fi nancial regulation. 2 Financial services liberalization through multilateral and bilateral agreements is the one exception. The fi nance sector in capital exporting countries (and, in particular, in the United States) lobbies both the trade ministry and the fi nance ministry on issues such as regarding trade in services and the use of capital controls.
Organization -but the latter was not formed because of U.S. resistance and was substituted by a " provisional" GATT. This decision has led to challenges regarding the interface of these two legal orders and how they align in areas of overlapping jurisdiction.
In this chapter, we focus on the interface and alignment of the trade and monetary TLOs across three major contemporary issues. 3 The alignment of a TLO with an issue has three aspects (Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1 ). First, alignment refers to the correspondence between the legal norms and the underlying issue. In some cases, the legal norms may be broad and the underlying issue may be narrow (such as the interface of the trade legal order on patent rights with the narrower issue of access to patented medicines). In other areas, the legal norms may be narrow and the underlying issue may be broad (such as a free transfer clause in a bilateral investment treaty affecting investors and the broader issue of fi nancial stability). Second, when multiple TLOs exist, alignment refers to the extent that they complement, overlap, or compete with each other (such as trade, environmental, and agricultural law regarding genetically modifi ed food). Third, TLOs can align and concord differently in terms of rules and practices at the international, national, and local levels (such as customs law where a particular products classifi cation or rule of origin may have different meanings in an international text, in national regulations, and in local customs practice).
This chapter addresses how and why the alignment of monetary and trade law varies regarding: (1) the use of trade restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds, (2) exchange rates and their relation to tariff commitments, and (3) capital controls and their relation to the liberalization of investment and trade in fi nancial services . We contend that variations in the interface and alignment of the trade and monetary legal orders across these three issues have important implications both for the legal orders themselves and for the ordering of behavior that they aim to affect. We show how legal ordering interacts with, and may be displaced by, other forms of ordering, in particular, political and market ordering with both macro (general welfare) and micro (distributive) implications. 3 Conceptually, the monetary and trade sides of each of our three issues can be treated as distinct substantive TLOs, so we could refer to six substantive TLOs. These substantive TLOs can be further broken down in terms of their geographic scope. For example, in Section IV we will see how the WTO, EU, bilateral free trade agreements, and investment treaties address capital transfers and capital controls in different ways, so they can each be viewed as a TLO. We simplify our analysis by aggregating treatment of the issues more conventionally as part of a trade and a monetary legal order but also recognize that a different conceptual classifi cation could be used. Thus, when we speak broadly of a trade or monetary TLO, these broad TLOs can be broken down into sub-TLOs based on substance (such as our three issue areas) and geography (such as all WTO members, the European Union, NAFTA, signatories of a model bilateral investment treaty that apply common legal norms, and so forth).
On our fi rst issue (that of trade restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds), the two legal orders align quite closely. They do so by making the rules and decisions of one TLO, the monetary TLO, largely determinative, and the second TLO, the trade TLO, helps enforce those rules and decisions. The result is a quite effective form of ordering for states and private parties. It is effective from a positive perspective, even though, as with all ordering, there are distributive implications for those who would otherwise benefi t from, or be harmed by, the trade restrictions.
On our second issue (that of exchange rates and trade), one legal order is stringent and the other weak, so the two are asymmetric. The rules of the strong TLO (that of trade), moreover, were drafted for a situation that no longer exists (the Bretton Woods system of fi xed exchange rates). There is thus no longer close correspondence between the legal norms of the trade order and the underlying issue of misaligned exchange rates. The result is that the weak legal order (that of monetary affairs) risks undermining the commitments of the other legal order (that of trade), which signifi cantly affects producers, their workers, and traders.
On our third issue (that of capital controls and the liberalization of investment and fi nancial services ), the trade legal order has fragmented, involving an array of bilateral agreements providing for free capital transfers for investors and fi nancial service providers, often backed by private enforcement mechanisms. These liberalization commitments compete with and risk undermining the purpose of providing monetary legal order to ensure global fi nancial stability and reduce the risks of fi nancial contagion.
The remainder of this chapter consists of fi ve sections. Section I provides the historical and institutional background for understanding the interface of the international trade and monetary legal orders. It briefl y explains how alignment of these two TLOs with the three issues has changed over time. Section II addresses the close alignment of the two TLOs on the issue of balance of payments, where balance-of payments diffi culties are used to justify trade restrictions. Section III assesses their misalignment as regards exchange rates in which there is considerable contestation over alleged government manipulation of exchange rates that undo the benefi t of tariff commitments, affect trade competitiveness, and pose the threat of "currency wars ." Section IV addresses their potentially competitive and confl icting alignment regarding capital controls and the liberalization of investment and fi nancial services. It examines the development and spread of new legal norms on capital within the United States, the European Union, the Organization on Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and a web of plurilateral and bilateral agreements. Section V explains the reasons for variation in the alignment of the monetary and trade TLOs, as well as their changes over time, in addressing these three issues. We then conclude with Section VI .
I. Background to the Trade and Monetary Legal Orders

A. Formation and Change of the Two TLOs
The international trade and monetary legal orders arose from crises -the disasters of the Great Depression and World War II -where global trade and monetary relations collapsed. Both the IMF and the GATT were forged from the failure of earlier efforts at multilateral cooperation on economic matters and the ensuing mutual harm caused by national trade and monetary policies during the inter-war period. According to the third of President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, the League of Nations was to remove economic barriers to trade and establish equal trading conditions among its members (Boughton 2004 ). The U.S. Senate, however, blocked the United States from joining the League, and the League, largely a European club, was too weak as an international organization to prevent the disintegration of the world economy in the 1930s and to stem the rise of nationalism and militarism. When countries faced economic crises, especially following the stock exchange collapses of 1929, they failed to cooperate over monetary and trade policy, leading to the disastrous beggar-thy-neighbor policies that exacerbated the Great Depression . Currency wars led to trade wars (Irwin 2011 ) . The world economy disintegrated into national autarchy, with all countries becoming worse off, and contributed to the countries' slow economic recoveries from the Great Depression.
The victories of the United States and its allies during World War II created a new and unique opportunity. Leaders in the United States and the United Kingdom, including John Maynard Keynes and Henry Dexter White, who respectively led the British and U.S. delegations at Bretton Woods in July 1944, advocated that a new international institution be created to ensure cooperation among central banks and fi nance ministries to avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies. The parties eventually agreed to the creation of the IMF, which would oversee a system of exchange rates based on agreed par values that could be adjusted only with the IMF's agreement to correct a "fundamental disequilibrium" in a country's balance of payments. This system, although it faced occasional challenges, would prevail for almost three decades.
Between 1945 and 1971, the IMF was in its heyday as the world's most infl uential and independent international organization. It oversaw an exchange rate system in which all currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, which was, in turn, backed by gold at $35 per ounce. In the words of its former General Counsel Joseph Gold ( 1990 : 2) , the original par value system was "unprecedented as a system for regulating the exchange rates of currencies under a multilateral treaty administered by an international organization." The IMF rules on exchange rates were strict, and states generally abided by them. Central banks regularly intervened in foreign exchange markets to maintain the pegs, and in practice, the pegs were rarely changed. The government treasury or central bank (depending on the national system) committed to exchange domestic currency for foreign currency at the par value. With a system of pegged exchange rates, there was no room for currency manipulation. Countries maintained capital controls to provide stability and enhance their ability to develop social welfare systems, giving rise to a system of "embedded liberalism" (Ruggie 1982 ) .
The Bretton Woods system collapsed in the early 1970s when the United States unilaterally ended the dollars' convertibility to gold and imposed an across-theboard tariff increase of 10 percent (Gardner 1985 ) . The dollar, as a result, became a fi at currency, one no longer backed by gold or any other precious metal. The Bretton Woods system of pegged exchange rates rapidly gave way to a world of national choice of exchange arrangements, with the United States and other major economies moving to fl oating exchange rates and European nations attempting to manage their exchange rates within defi ned bans (Lastra 2006 ) . With the breakdown, some contend that "the world monetary system slipped back into the kind of ' monetary chaos' that had characterized the pre-war period and its dismal economic and political outcomes" (UNCTAD 2004 ). Yet another way of viewing the change is by suggesting that legal ordering declined and was displaced increasingly by political and market ordering. Markets determined the value of fl oating currencies. And when disputes arose over government actions, governments used diplomacy and political pressure to coordinate a realignment of exchange rates, as refl ected in the 1985 Plaza Accord. 4 Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF's role signifi cantly decreased with regards to developed economies . Its primary function changed from being the coordinator and potential enforcer of an international monetary system of rules-based pegged exchange rates to being a surveillance organization that issues country reports regarding a country's economic and balance-of-payments situation, as well as a lender and adviser for developing countries facing balance-of-payments problems. This latter role involved only developing countries until the 2008 fi nancial crisis. As Rosa Lastra writes, "[f]rom being a virtually self-enforcing arrangement subject to strict rules , surveillance now becomes a function in which judgement is of the essence. Surveillance is no longer a rules-based regime but a discretion based regime " (Lastra 2006 : 400, emphasis added). The monetary TLO for exchange rate 4 Under the Plaza Accord of 1985, the United States, the United Kingdom, France , Japan , and West Germany collectively intervened in currency markets to induce an appreciation of the yen and deutsche mark and thereby help stem protectionist pressures from the private sector for restrictive trade measures in the United States. They did so, however, in a particular geopolitical context in which Japan and Europe depended on the U.S. security umbrella in the context of the Cold War and in which the United States exercised greater market power than it does today. governance had largely folded. Allegations of currency misalignment and manipulation became an issue only after the system's collapse in 1971. Although IMF members adopted and attempted to elaborate new rules to address exchange rate controversies, the rules remained weak in practice.
After World War II , the United States also pressed for a trading system based on non-discrimination, which was antithetical to a world economic system based on preferential agreements, such as Britain's imperial preferences for trade within its colonies and dominions. The United States used its leverage from its lending to Britain under the Lend-Lease program to pressure the United Kingdom to abolish imperial preferences. With the GATT, the United States aimed to institutionalize the removal of such trade discrimination, although it would take some time (Zeiler 1997 ) .
Unlike the IMF, the GATT was a weak organization when the treaty entered into force in 1948 as a provisional agreement, but it developed over time through administrative practices and a series of negotiating rounds pursuant to which tariffs were bound at signifi cantly lower rates. In 1982, the GATT Director General created a small legal affairs division within the secretariat refl ecting and facilitating the move toward a more legalized dispute settlement system. Spurred by greater market access commitments and a more legalized system of dispute settlement, the number of GATT claims rose signifi cantly in the late 1980s (Hudec 1993 ) . The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, initiated in 1988, concluded with the agreement to create, for the fi rst time, a formal international trade organization, the WTO.
Following the WTO's creation in 1995, the trade legal order reached the height of its infl uence. The WTO expanded the trade TLO's legal scope to include an array of new agreements covering non-tariff barriers, services, and intellectual property protection. In addition to its expanded legal scope, the WTO created a compulsory dispute settlement system to interpret its legal requirements and authorize enforcement measures. International trade law can thus be used as a sword and as a shield regarding national measures implicating trade and monetary legal order. WTO rules can be used as a sword when permitting countries such as the United States to challenge long-standing import quotas of developing countries, such as India, maintained on balance-of-payments grounds (addressed in Section II ). WTO rules can be used as a shield when one country acts unilaterally in response to another country's measures -say, the United States raising import restrictions on account of China's currency practices (addressed in Section III ). In such cases, the targeted country can defend itself by bringing a WTO complaint. The asymmetric nature of the two legal orders and the fact that GATT law was drafted for a Bretton Woods system that no longer exists have resulted in considerable misalignment. By 2013, both the IMF and GATT/WTO had expanded their geographic scope , which initially had been limited, to include most of the world. Yet during the 1990s and 2000s, the trade TLO became increasingly fragmented as countries signed an array of bilateral and plurilateral trade and investment agreements. The U.S. and European countries successfully included new commitments to open capital markets through such agreements with developing countries. These agreements often created private enforcement rights for investors. As a result, the fragmentation of the trade legal order further complicated the trade-monetary law interface, potentially placing the two legal orders in confl ict over the issue of capital controls. Table 5 .1 summarizes the current rules of the two TLOs on these three issues. Table 5 .2 summarizes the change of alignment of the monetary and trade TLOs from the Bretton Woods system to today across these issues, which we present in greater detail in Sections II-IV.
B. The WTO-IMF Formal Legal Relationship
The GATT was signed in 1947, three years after the IMF, and the drafters explicitly addressed GATT deference to the IMF on issues affecting the IMF's area of jurisdiction in order to align the two legal orders. Article XV of the GATT expressly recognizes the IMF's authority on monetary matters and provides for consultations to allow the WTO to benefi t from the IMF's expertise. This provision continues to form the basis for WTO consultation with the IMF on monetary and fi nancial issues affecting trade. Paragraph 2 requires that GATT members " shall consult fully " with the Fund when dealing with balance-of-payments issues, and " [i] reserves, a very low level of its monetary reserves, and as to the fi nancial aspects of other matters covered in consultation in such cases" ( emphasis added). In sum, from the GATT's creation until today, the formal alignment of the legal relationship between the two organizations is "'one-sided' in that only the WTO Agreements take Fund jurisdiction into account and expressly require the WTO to rely on the Fund for its expertise" (Siegel 2002 : 568) . Over time, however, the trade legal order became more independent as it judicialized, raising new alignment challenges .
C. Decision Making and Organizational Culture
To understand WTO-IMF coordination in global economic governance, one needs to account for differences in the institutions' respective decision-making rules and practices and in their institutional cultures. In terms of decision-making rules and practices, voting in the IMF is weighted on the basis of quotas in relation to In practice, despite their different voting rules, both organizations have a strong culture of consensus, although consensus operates differently, refl ecting their institutional differences. Decision making in the WTO (in practice) is by consensus among the entire membership and each country (in theory) therefore has to agree to not block a decision, whereas consensus at the IMF refers to consensus of the Executive Board, of which there are only twenty-four members. 5 The number of countries that need to support a measure for there to be consensus is thus much smaller at the IMF compared to at the WTO, and the shadow of the vote is arguably greater before the IMF Executive Board. Moreover, the IMF Executive Board, in practice, frequently issues decisions because of the number of fi nancing arrangements, surveillance and reporting activities, and technical assistance in which the IMF is engaged, whereas the executive bodies of the WTO issue few decisions except in relation to adoption of the (quasi-judicial) decisions of WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body, which are rote decisions because the adoption of a panel or Appellate Body report can only be blocked by consensus.
As to their organizational cultures, the primary constituencies of the Fund are fi nance ministries, with economists playing the leading role, whereas those in the WTO are trade ministries, with lawyers playing increasingly important roles and the leading role under its dispute settlement system. The two organizations are thus commonly viewed in terms of the "trade and fi nance communities" (Siegel 2002 : 599) . Any divides in policy between the Fund and the WTO can refl ect divisions within governments between these different ministries and their respective constituencies, as well as the different disciplinary frameworks of economists and lawyers.
In addition, the IMF staff has signifi cantly more autonomy and resources than the WTO secretariat does. In 2012, the IMF had about 2,000 professional and managerial 5 Article XII of the IMF Articles addresses the powers of the Executive Board. Only eight countries (the United States, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, Japan, Russia, Germany, and China) have their own Executive Director at the IMF, whereas all other countries are part of multi-country constituencies through which they are represented on the Executive Board. See http://www.imf.org/ external/np/sec/memdir/ED_110112.pdf . staff, 470 support staff and an operating budget of US$985 million (excluding IMF fi nancing arrangements and pledged and committed resources of more than US$1 trillion), whereas the WTO had a professional staff of around 380 professionals, 290 support staff, and a budget of CHF 196 million (or about US$208 million). Even more importantly, unlike the IMF staff, the WTO secretariat has no competence to engage in direct consultations with a member but only to service them. In contrast, IMF members owe obligations to the Fund itself, for whom the IMF staff work. They engage in "missions" to countries, where they assess member policies and provide advice on reforms. IMF missions, in practice, can mix formal Article IV surveillance (addressed in Section IIIB ), technical assistance, and conditionality for fi nancing, a cocktail that bolsters the staff's infl uence over developing countries' fi nancial laws and economic policies. The IMF's internal rules require the IMF managing director to bring cases of breach of obligations to the IMF Executive Board, something unthinkable in the WTO context .
As to the role of law, both the WTO agreements and the IMF Articles formally impose hard-law obligations. The WTO agreements consist of around 26,000 pages of legal rules and tariff and services commitments, backed by a formalized dispute settlement system. Although the WTO has no formal sanctioning powers, WTO dispute settlement panels and the WTO Appellate Body issue legal rulings that are binding on the parties to the dispute and that are regularly cited for their interpretations and applications of WTO law in subsequent disputes and rulings. If the respondent fails to comply with a ruling, the complainant has the option to enforce it through withdrawing trade concessions in an equivalent amount, something unthinkable in the IMF context. This jurisprudence accumulated to more than 90,000 pages by 2014.
The WTO also retains soft-law mechanisms for consultations and peer review that can facilitate compliance and dispute settlement, in particular through its committee system and its Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Even in the formal dispute settlement system, consultations are a built-in feature to resolve disputes amicably. Nonetheless, the WTO system has become much more legalized than the original GATT, and it is now built on a hard-law model that can affect deliberations in its soft-law-type forums. WTO members had fi led 482 cases before the WTO dispute settlement system as of June 2014. WTO hard law thus exercises a much greater shadow effect on interactions within the WTO committee system. This judicialization of the trading order has curtailed the power of diplomats in favor of lawyers (Weiler 2002 ) and potentially made it more challenging to reconcile the trade and monetary organizational cultures.
The IMF Articles also contain binding rules, and the IMF even has the organizational authority to impose sanctions to enforce them, such as withdrawing the eligibility of a member's access to Fund resources, suspending its voting rights, or even compelling it to withdraw from the Fund. In reality, however, ineligibility for funds and the suspension of voting rights are rare occurrences in Fund practice, and no country has yet been forced out of the IMF. The Fund, moreover, lacks a formal dispute settlement system. Rather, the Fund relies on consultations with IMF members, where IMF authority is based on Fund professional "expertise" and, if applicable, any leverage the Fund has over a country in fi nancial diffi culty, as in the context of an IMF fi nancing arrangements. Although some of the IMF's legal provisions are formally hard, they are in practice rather soft, in particular because their enforcement depends on consultations (Gold 1982b ).
II. Close Alignment on Trade in Relation to
Balance-of-Payments Concerns
The IMF and GATT/WTO have coordinated their roles most closely over the issue of whether a country can raise trade restrictions in light of balance-of-payments diffi culties, resulting in the relatively close alignment of the two TLOs and settlement of the legal norms over this issue. They have largely done so through the use of informal peer review-type consultation processes conducted within the IMF and WTO but in the shadow of potential WTO dispute settlement . Because most restrictions on trade and payments in the period between the two world wars were justifi ed on balance-of-payments grounds, a main hope in creating the IMF was to limit future balance-of-payments problems by increasing the amount of reserves on which a country could rely (Article I of IMF Articles). If a member seeks to use IMF reserves to address balance-of-payments problems, the IMF requires the member to demonstrate a commitment to policy reforms, as well as to forbear applying trade restrictions. The GATT correspondingly contains provisions permitting temporary trade restrictions on an exceptional basis when a member faces a balance-of-payments crisis as confi rmed by the IMF under the IMF Articles. The GATT, negotiated after the IMF Articles, incorporates by reference the preexisting international monetary rules and the contemplated role of the IMF. 6 As part of the Uruguay Round , WTO members supplemented the GATT provisions with the Understanding on the Balance-of-Payments Provisions of the GATT 1994, which sets forth procedures for reviewing trade restrictions imposed on balance-of-payments grounds by the WTO Committee on Balance-of-Payments (BOP Committee). In short, both the committee process and the dispute settlement process have become more legalized .
A. Handling Issues before the WTO Balance-of-Payments Committee
The BOP Committee had its predecessor in the GATT, which met to address trade restrictions that might be justifi ed on balance-of-payments concerns. The committee was more active during the GATT and particularly following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s. In 1975, for example, the GATT BOP Committee "found 24 separate instances in which import surcharges had been taken for balance-of-payments purposes and 17 cases in which import deposit schemes had been imposed from 1970 -1974 " (Stewart & Drake 2009 .
7 Between 1974 and 1985, the BOP Committee held 112 consultations with 21 developing countries, in addition to a number of consultations with Finland, Italy, Hungary, and New Zealand (Eglin 1987 ) .
Following the WTO's creation, the BOP Committee was even more active than it is today. It oversaw around fourteen measures when the WTO was created in 1995, and the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Slovak Republic each notifi ed the BOP Committee of new import restrictions between 1995 and 1998 (Stewart & Drake 2009 : 8) . By 2008, all of these restrictions had been removed, following the completion by Bangladesh of its phaseout of restrictions. This removal refl ected the success of trade liberalization and neo-liberal thought, and the BOP Committee had become dormant. During the 2008 fi nancial crisis , Ecuador and Ukraine, whose currencies were respectively dollarized and pegged to the dollar, adopted temporary restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds, but those restrictions were also terminated through the BOP Committee process.
As part of the committee's procedures, the WTO secretariat can prepare a Background Paper discussing the country's trade and exchange policies in light of its economic situation, in particular its balance-of-payments situation. In preparation for this background paper, the secretariat will obtain documentation from the IMF, such as "a paper on 'Recent Economic Developments' including statistics covering the balance-of-payments" (WTO 2013 ) . Before circulating the background paper, the secretariat will contact and work with the IMF and the country in question to ensure its accuracy.
When the IMF receives a consultation request from the WTO, the IMF staff prepares the analysis that it submits to the IMF Executive Board. The Executive Board formally approves the response, and the staff then submits it to the WTO. The countries and date of initial consultation are: Bangladesh (1995), Brazil (1995) , Bulgaria (1997 ), Czech Republic (1997 , Ecuador ( ), Egypt (1995 , Hungary (1995 ), India (1995 ), Nigeria (1996 , Pakistan (1996) , the Philippines (1995), Poland (1995) , Romania (1998) , the Slovak Republic (1997), Slovakia (1995 ), South Africa (1995 ), Sri Lanka (1995 , Tunisia (1996) , Turkey (1995) , and Ukraine (2009) . IMF Annual Reports of the Committee on the Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, http://www.imf.org/external/bopage/arindex.htm .
The WTO BOP Committee meeting starts with an initial statement by the member concerned, followed by a formal statement by the IMF to the committee. 8 The committee members proceed to exchange views regarding the measure in light of the documentation provided and any less trade-restrictive alternatives available.
The procedures used in 2009 regarding Ecuador and Ukraine show how the system works, including its transnational aspects. In Ecuador, the idea of using a balance-of-payments exception came from the head of the chamber of commerce, which represents the private sector, through a former government representative to the WTO (Shaffer Interview 2012 ) . The government used the exception to temporarily increase tariffs on 369 tariff lines and imposed quota restrictions on 271 others, affecting 23 percent of its imports. 9 The BOP Committee held a series of consultations and, because the issues involved IMF assessments, many countries, such as the United States, sent members of the treasury department together with a representative from the trade department that normally handles WTO matters to meetings. Following the IMF statement that Ecuador had genuine balance-ofpayments diffi culties, the committee found that Ecuador's quantitative restrictions were in conformity with GATT requirements as a temporary measure. Ecuador agreed to replace them progressively and to remove all of them by January 22, 2010. 10 Because of ongoing economic diffi culties for its private sector, Ecuador ended up taking one year longer than initially agreed upon, but it removed the restrictions as the dollar depreciated, and its exports became more competitive.
Ukraine, a new WTO member, likewise tested the exception in applying a 13 percent tax surcharge on imports of automobiles and refrigerators, which sparked strong reactions from numerous WTO members whose trade sectors were affected, including the European Union, the United States, Japan, and Korea.
11 Unlike Ecuador, Ukraine had an ongoing fi nancing arrangement with the IMF pursuant to which Ukraine had agreed to refrain from introducing any trade restrictions, which increased leverage on it. The BOP Committee thus "concluded that the measures taken by Ukraine were not justifi ed by its balance-of-payments situation and had not been applied in a manner consistent with [GATT] requirements." Ukraine complied by notifying the committee that it had discontinued its 13 percent tax surcharge on 8 For developing country members, a less demanding, "simplifi ed procedure" may be used (as set forth in a 1979 Declaration), subject to certain conditions (as set forth in the 1994 Understanding). imports as of September 7, 2009. 12 The two legal orders, in short, aligned closely, facilitating the resolution of both disputes .
B. Handling Issues before the WTO Dispute Settlement System
If WTO members do not reach consensus in the committee and a member does not remove its measures, a country can bring a complaint before the WTO dispute settlement system, and the respondent can raise a defense that the trade restrictions are justifi ed on balance-of-payments grounds. In the dispute settlement context, a key question is who determines the relevant law and facts in the application of WTO legal norms referring to balance-of-payment issues. According to the IMF, it has sole authority and the WTO is obliged to consult with the IMF and follow its determinations. In practice, because the IMF has no comparable dispute settlement system, if the legality of measures under the IMF Articles is at issue in WTO disputes, the WTO could become "a residual enforcer for the IMF" (Howse et al. 2009 : 196) . Given the weighted voting rules on the IMF's Executive Board favoring the United States and Europe, such IMF opinions could be controversial in the WTO dispute settlement context. In practice, WTO dispute settlement panels have sought and relied on the opinion of the IMF but in a way that leaves it open as to whether the IMF opinion is defi nitive and binding on the WTO panels (Zimmerman 2011 ). It is conceivable, although doubtful in practice, that panels or the Appellate Body could depart from the IMF's opinion.
Under the early years of the GATT, the role of the IMF in dispute settlement was much less formalized because of the GATT's more diplomatic nature, so the dispute settlement process and the potential recommendations of "working parties" operated more analogously to the WTO committee system today. In contrast, in the one WTO case addressing balance-of payment-restrictions, the India-Quantitative Restrictions case of 1999, the WTO panel and Appellate Body issued highly legalized decisions. At the WTO panel's request, the IMF "supplied information concerning the evolution of India's balance-of-payments and reserve situation until June 1998." The panel asked the IMF a series of questions regarding India's monetary reserves, and the IMF provided data and concluded that "India's reserves appeared to provide suffi cient external liquidity and a reasonable degree of protection against unforeseen external shocks," so the reserves were "adequate" and "did not appear to be under a threat of a serious decline" (WTO Panel Report: 5.165). The panel held against India, fi nding that "the quality and weight of evidence is strongly in favour of the proposition that India's reserves are not inadequate." It noted, "[i]n particular, this position is supported by the IMF" (5.176). The panel recalled, in addition, the IMF's reply to one of its questions "that India's external situation can be managed by using macroeconomic policy instruments alone" (5.211) and that this "would not necessarily constitute a change in India's development policy" (5.220). The Appellate Body upheld the panel's fi ndings on appeal.
India's response to the panel and Appellate Body decisions illustrates the transnational nature of legal ordering. High-level members of the Indian government quietly welcomed the decisions, as those decisions helped facilitate the carrying out of Indian legal reforms and could be used as leverage against political opposition and bureaucratic delay (Shaffer et al. in press ). These offi cials had been constrained by domestic politics from reforming the Indian "license raj" system of import protection by those fi rms and offi cials that benefi tted from it. Reforms had been attempted earlier, but the WTO litigation provided the necessary prodding and helped stabilize the reform efforts, which were cemented in order to comply with the WTO ruling. India withdrew its quantitative restrictions involving more than two thousand tariff lines, signifi cantly liberalizing its import-licensing regime. The change represented a major structural shift in India and its development policy, one that has become institutionalized. The alignment of the two legal orders facilitated signifi cant domestic policy change in this large emerging economy .
III. Asymmetric Law on Exchange Rates and Currency Manipulation
More than any other issue, exchange rates constantly entail the interface of the trade and monetary legal orders. Because trade and exchange rates are inextricably intertwined, countries are wary of agreeing to and maintaining tariff bindings if the contracting parties' currencies may suddenly be depreciated at any time, placing their producers at a competitive disadvantage. Tariffs, subsidies, and government-induced currency depreciations are functional substitutes for providing a competitive advantage. A 10 percent depreciation of a country's currency equals a 10 percent tariff increase and can take place over night, whereas a tariff binding may have taken years to negotiate. Tariff cuts and ongoing trade relations thus depend, in part, on the perception that exchange rates are not manipulated or misaligned. The Bretton Woods system was erected under the perception that currency wars beget trade wars, and thus the exchange rate issue needed to be addressed fi rst . As White wrote in the run-up to the Bretton Woods conference, the "Fund is designed for a special purpose, and that purpose is to prevent competitive depreciation of currencies" (Steil 2013 : 208) . Keynes concomitantly stressed the need to address monetary stability before engaging in trade negotiations, because "[i]t is extraordinarily diffi cult to frame any proposals about tariffs if countries are free to alter the value of their currencies without agreement and at short notice. Tariffs and currency depreciations are in many cases alternatives" (Steil 2013 : 185) . Together, White and Keynes negotiated a system of fi xed exchange rates under the IMF Articles that could be adjusted with the IMF's agreement. These IMF Articles provided the basis for the GATT and the subsequent tariff negotiations under it that led to increased trade liberalization in the post-World War II era. GATT Article II provides for the binding of tariffs, while noting (in paragraph 6) that such tariff bindings "may be adjusted to take account of" a reduction in the par value of a currency that agrees "consistently with the IMF Articles."
After the Bretton Woods system collapsed in the 1970s and the currencies of major developed economies fl oated, the transnational dimension of the interface of exchange rate and trade policy became more salient. It did so because the parity of currencies refl ects domestic policies and private behavior, including domestic policy over government fi scal defi cits and interest rates, as well as private consumption, debt, and savings. Nation-state fi scal and monetary policies affect private behavior, whether they are development policies based on fi nancial repression as applied now by China and earlier by Japan and Korea or the low interest rate and fi scal defi cit policies of the United States. These nation-state policies have externalities for other countries, and they give rise to global and regional imbalances, such as that between Germany and other countries in the Eurozone and that between China and the United States. These imbalances create pressure within nation-states to adopt protectionist trade and exchange rate policies, like the ones that earlier exacerbated the Great Depression and helped spur the creation of the Bretton Woods system in the fi rst place. National laws and policies, together with private saving, consumption, investment, lending, and trading activities, are thus transnationally intertwined, as are international and national law and policy.
Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the legalization of trade relations under the WTO, law's role in regulating the two sides of the trade and exchange rate equation has become highly asymmetric. Although trade in goods, and to a lesser extent trade in services, are highly regulated by legal rules backed by an enforcement mechanism, currency valuation is now determined by the discretionary activities of central banks and treasury departments that are run largely by economists with little to no guidance from law. Monetary and fi nance policymakers have been wary of applying law to resolve concerns over the interface of exchange rate and trade law and policy, resulting in greater challenges for managing the adverse transnational externalities from national public and private decisions. Major tensions have accordingly arisen when producers and policy leaders view their country as unfairly disadvantaged because of another country's undervalued currency .
A. The Rise of Global Imbalances
Throughout the past decade, global imbalances and associated allegations of currency misalignment and manipulation have become one of the most pressing issues facing the international community. The issue raises the question as to what role the trade TLO and the monetary TLO can play in ensuring the orderly unwinding of global imbalances. This unwinding poses a major threat not only to crossborder trade in goods and services and cross-border fi nancial transactions but also to the stability of the international economic system as a whole. Can the trade and monetary legal orders align as they do on balance-of-payments issues affecting current accounts? Thus far, they have not, as actors have been unable or unwilling to use the trade or the monetary TLO to play an important role in alleviating global imbalances -widely seen as one of the proximate causes of the global fi nancial crisis that started in 2008.
Debtor countries tend to advocate multilateral solutions that require creditor countries to assume some responsibility for limiting global imbalances. The burden of adjustment, they contend, should not lie solely with them. The United Kingdom adopted this position during the Bretton Woods negotiations, but the United States, which was the major surplus country at the time, blocked Keynes's initiatives (Steil 2013 : 208) . Now, the United States has accumulated large current account defi cits and has pressed the IMF to interpret and apply IMF rules to induce China to change its policies. China, in turn, has resisted any such infringement on its sovereignty .
B. The IMF Provisions: The Limits of Law
The creation of the IMF resulted in considerable exchange rate stability for more than twenty-fi ve years because of a rules-based system that permitted the relatively close alignment of the transnational trade and monetary legal orders. But after the collapse of the Bretton Woods arrangement and the turn to fl oating exchange rates by the world's major economies in the 1970s, the interface of the two legal orders became challenging as regards global imbalances and exchange rates. IMF Article IV now permits countries to choose their exchange arrangements, subject to IMF surveillance and member compliance with a series of principles that are rather soft in nature and in practice. As Andreas Lowenfeld ( 2010 : 582, emphasis added) writes, "the fundamental rule [of pegged exchange rates] was replaced by a non-rule ." Law receded as a means to resolve confl icts between debtor and surplus counties.
The revised IMF Articles create only minimal legal requirements, ones that are diffi cult to apply and enforce in practice. The preamble to the revised Article IV provides that "each member undertakes to collaborate with the Fund and other members to assure orderly exchange arrangements and to promote a stable system of exchange rates." Section 1(iii) of Article IV provides, "in particular," that members shall "avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance-of-payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members." The legal standard for showing "manipulation" is a delicate one because it includes both objective and subjective criteria -that of a government's intervention in exchange markets and that of a country's intent. The IMF has never made such a fi nding.
Pursuant to Article IV, the IMF adopted a surveillance system to ensure members' compliance with their obligations and thereby protect the stability of the global monetary system. 13 Members are to cooperate fully with the IMF and, to this end, "shall provide the Fund with the information necessary" and "when requested by the Fund, shall consult with it on the member's exchange rate policies" (Article IV.3.B). In 1977, the IMF Executive Board adopted a "Decision on Surveillance over Exchange Rate Policies" that established several factors that the Fund must consider, "which might indicate the need for discussion with a member" (IMF 1977 ) . Included in these factors is "protracted large-scale intervention in one direction in exchange markets." In this way, the IMF can attempt to use the shadow of IMF rules to persuade countries to change their behavior.
IMF surveillance can also help diffuse ideas about monetary and fi nancial policy. One of the lynchpins for establishing a coherent, orderly, and stable monetary policy is the establishment of an independent central bank staffed by technical experts working toward common ends, such as monetary and fi nancial stability, so that monetary policy is insulated from domestic politics. These technical experts read the same economic literature and often attend the same universities, particularly universities in the United States (Miller-Adams 1999 ; Clotfelter 2010 ) . These offi cials also may spend time in the IMF itself or in its sister organization, the World Bank. By creating common institutions staffed by those with common backgrounds, the international monetary legal order can penetrate transnationally into the nation-state, both in terms of formal laws that create an independent central bank and fi nancial regulations and in terms of practice by offi cials within these institutions. The IMF is part of a network of organizations, including the Financial Stability Board and G20, which aim to contribute to greater international and transnational cooperation based on common, epistemic understandings of problems and their solutions in order to ensure monetary and fi nancial stability. In particular, the IMF uses its surveillance mission to promote the adoption of twelve core international standards through its Reports on Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) (Helleiner, Chapter 6 ).
The IMF, however, has played little role regarding exchange rate policies, despite its mandate and its regular surveillance procedures. It has initiated and conducted formal consultations with members regarding their exchange rate policy only twice, on an ad hoc basis, with Sweden in 1982 and South Korea in 1987 (Goldstein 2006 : 150) . In both cases, the IMF did not fi nd that the country was unlawfully manipulating its currency and only consulted with the country in order to induce it to change its domestic practices.
Because China is the largest creditor in the world and has a huge trade surplus, China became a center of concern in the United States during the 2000s regarding the interface of trade and monetary policy. China has actively and regularly intervened in foreign exchange markets, with the result that the renminbi (or yuan) does not appreciate as it otherwise would. China's foreign exchange reserves have risen in the process from $403 billion at the end of 2003 to more than $3.3 trillion by the end of 2011. U.S. policymakers have responded by raising allegations of currency manipulation, as refl ected in the 2012 U.S. political campaign in which Republican candidate Mitt Romney proclaimed that he would declare China a currency manipulator on his fi rst day of offi ce.
The U.S. executive branch attempted to press the IMF to be more aggressive toward China in its Article IV surveillance. Working with other countries, the United States aimed to use its infl uence in the IMF to induce the IMF to pressure China to permit the renminbi to appreciate. These actions divided IMF staff, some of which found "that the US Treasury wanted them to do its dirty work" (Blustein 2012 : 11) .
In 2007, IMF staff prepared and the Executive Board adopted a revision to the IMF's surveillance guidelines called the "Decision on Bilateral Surveillance over Member's Policies." Controversially, the IMF Decision adopted "fundamental exchange rate misalignment" as its key term for surveillance, which was the very language used in a U.S. Senate bill sponsored by Senators Charles Grassley and Max Baucus, respectively the Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate Finance Committee. The IMF Executive Board adopted the principles, despite China's vote to the contrary, after considerable IMF and U.S. efforts at persuading non-OECD members of the Executive Board who initially opposed it. This 2007 Decision could be read as tempering the reference to "currency manipulation" (the "scarlet M" in the words of U.S. Treasury Under Secretary Timothy Adams) (Blustein 2012 : 12) with the less politically charged language of "fundamental exchange rate misalignment" and to do so in the context of an open-ended, but formally binding, IMF Article IV undertaking.
The use of common text illustrates how transnational legal ordering often works by exporting legal norms from a national context -such as that of the United Statesto an international one -such as that of the IMF -which are then applied to other nation-states. This technocratic language of "fundamental misalignment" could now be used in IMF surveillance reports to trigger formal IMF consultations with China. Some staffers in IMF area desks that had relationships with national authorities opposed the new IMF surveillance guidelines applying this language, because they believed it would result in a "legalistic" and "mechanistic" judging of exchange rates. Yet the IMF staff was under considerable pressure from the U.S. Treasury to fi nd that the renminbi was fundamentally misaligned. This pressure allegedly even sparked remarks by IMF Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn that it was "blackmail," because the IMF needed Congressional votes to maintain the Fund's fi nancial viability (Blustein 2012 : 21) .
The Fund's staff attempted to implement the Decision in preparing the next Article IV report on China in September 2008, fi nding that "there are signifi cant concerns that the exchange rate may be fundamentally misaligned and exchange rate policies could be a signifi cant contributor to external instability." However, the IMF did not publicly release the report in light of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, which catalyzed the global fi nancial crisis. The IMF apparently understood that it was not an opportune time to pick a fi ght with China (Blustein 2012 : 21) .
China reacted vigorously to the IMF Decision and draft surveillance report. The report , in particular, could provide ammunition for a WTO complaint against it, as well as justifi cation of unilateral protectionist measures. China thus aimed to curtail the IMF process, allegedly by no longer making its high-level policymakers available to the IMF for discussions. Long-term relationships that the IMF staff in the Asia and Pacifi c Area Department had created with Chinese offi cials were undercut, creating divisions among IMF staff. 14 The IMF eventually backed down and, somewhat humiliated, abandoned the use of the term "fundamental misalignment." It quickly adopted a "revised operational guidance" for its 2007 Decision that it posted on its website, noting: "The attempt to apply exchange rate-related 'labels'-for instance the use of specifi c terminology such as 'fundamental misalignment' . . . has proved an impediment to effective implementation of the Decision." The IMF acknowledged that this episode had been "damaging [to] the Fund's credibility" (Blustein 2012 : 23) . Instead of " fundamental misalignment," the IMF used terms such as "under-or overvaluation" in its ensuing country reports under Article IV (IMF 2009 : para. 8 ). The episode demonstrated how the rise of China reduced U.S. leverage to advance its goals bilaterally and through the IMF.
C. Applicability of WTO Law in a Post-Bretton Woods System
Private actors, both unions and companies, have pressed U.S. politicians to take action against China. They believe that the undervalued Chinese renminbi has helped decimate U.S. manufacturing and exacerbate U.S. unemployment, which became more salient in the "Great Recession" and 2007/2008 fi nancial crisis . Politicians responded by introducing bills to apply protectionist measures, whether in the form of an immediate tariff increase on Chinese imports or a revision of U.S. subsidy and antidumping rules to permit increased duties to be applied on account of a misaligned currency (Bergsten & Gagnon 2012 ) . The U.S. Senate passed a Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act on October 11, 2011, by a 79-11 vote; the Act allows any "fundamentally misaligned" currency to be labeled a subsidy subject to U.S. countervailing duties and also allows such misalignment to be taken into account in the calculation of antidumping calculations.
These national legislative bills raise the issue of the interface of exchange rate policy with the trade legal order. Unlike the IMF, the WTO has an effective mechanism to enforce its rules. Yet despite the potential for WTO enforcement, it is questionable whether a currency dispute could be successfully brought before the WTO, because the monetary and trade legal orders are less closely aligned on the issue of exchange rates than they are on balance-of-payments measures. The WTO rules, drafted in 1947 after the creation of the IMF, are not tailored to address currency valuations in a world without multilaterally fi xed exchange rates.
Nonetheless, policymakers and commentators increasingly have addressed the WTO legal grounds for unilateral import relief or a claim against a country manipulating it currency. The U.S. government has engaged in extensive analysis in particular (Shaffer Interview 2013 ) . A number of authors contend that trade law actions against such a country would contribute positively to global governance by mitigating global imbalances (Mattoo & Subramanian 2008 ; Bergsten & Gagnon 2012 ) .
There are at least four potential grounds under WTO rules for addressing the adverse consequences of an undervalued currency: (1) that a member has used exchange action to frustrate the intent of the GATT agreement, which is prohibited under GATT Article XV.4; (2) that a member has applied an export subsidy, which is prohibited under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures; (3) that there has been a change in currency value analogous to a de facto change in par value authorizing a revision of tariffs under GATT Article II; and (4) that the country has adopted measures that do not violate any WTO provision but nonetheless result in the nullifi cation and impairment of negotiated tariff concessions (known as a "non-violation nullifi cation and impairment" complaint).
15 15 In political circles, there has been some talk of providing for an antidumping claim. We do not list such a claim because, under current WTO rules, it could not stand, given that any currency misalignment or manipulation will equally affect pricing in both home and export markets and should not affect the calculation of a dumping margin.
The various arguments under WTO law come into play not only as justifi cations of unilateral action or as part of a formal WTO complaint. They also can be used as arguments to persuade countries to abstain from interventions that reduce the value of their currencies, because if they do not do so, trade measures will be taken. Even if such trade measures were challenged for violating WTO rules, they would remain in effect at least for the three-year period that it takes to resolve a fully litigated WTO complaint. A country thus might be willing to take action that reduces the likelihood of a legal action, such as China's permitting the renminbi to gradually appreciate.
Were a country to adopt such unilateral measures against another WTO member on currency grounds, the targeted member itself would have a strong WTO complaint. In our view, it would likely succeed for reasons addressed elsewhere (Staiger & Sykes 2010 ) . For example, GATT Article XV.4 provides that WTO members "shall not, by exchange action, frustrate the intent of the provisions of this Agreement, nor, by trade action, the intent of the provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund." The phrase "exchange action," however, most likely refers to exchange restrictions and the use of multiple exchange rates in the world of pegged exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system. The drafters of this provision, in other words, did not write it for a world where countries have considerable choice over their exchange arrangements. Similarly, although a member might fi nd that a fundamentally misaligned currency is analogous to the situation of a change in a currency's par value under a fi xed exchange rate, as contemplated under the GATT Article II.6, this provision was written in the context of the initial Bretton Woods system. Because the par value system no longer exists, this provision is not directly applicable.
As a result of the weakness of the claims, WTO rules can be used as a shield against unilateral threats, reducing their effectiveness. WTO rules arguably have thus constrained the United States from taking unilateral action, including through countervailing duties (Shaffer Interview 2013 ) . Such a prospect highlights the asymmetric nature of trade and monetary law, because the monetary order provides neither clear rules nor a judicial system to interpret and enforce them when a country is arguably violating its obligations under IMF Article IV. Were a country adversely affected by such exchange rates and monetary policy to take unilateral trade action, that country would potentially face a complaint before the WTO dispute settlement system. If China successfully challenged U.S. measures successfully before the WTO, the resulting political uproar in the U.S. Congress would likely be severe. Such a decision would raise further challenges within the United States to the WTO's legitimacy, highlighting the risks of such action for the trade legal order itself. Use of the law has thus remained in abeyance, in part because of the perceived weakness of these complaints and in part because of concern that use of the law against a major economic power might be counterproductive for the trade legal system as a whole .
D. Brazil's Initiative at the WTO and the Turn to Diplomacy within the G20
Because of its concerns that the trade and monetary legal orders were not sufficiently aligned, Brazil took the lead in initiating consultations on the exchange rate situation within the WTO's Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance in 2011. It did so without signaling China but rather called attention to monetary policies of "quantitative easing " in the United States and other developed country monetary authorities. Brazil is not alone in such concerns. For example, Chile's Finance Minister, on behalf of the new Pacifi c Alliance of Latin American countries (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru) , stated, "there has never been a period in history like today with economic stimulus policies in the European Union, Japan and the United States. Qualitative easing policies in these countries are putting pressures on our currencies, creating major challenges for the competitiveness of our exports" (Chauvin 2013 ) .
On April 13, 2011, Brazil brought a two-pillared proposal on the subject to the WTO Working Group. 16 The fi rst pillar of Brazil's initiative before the WTO called for a study of the relationship between exchange rates and international trade, particularly in light of the recent economic crisis. In response, the WTO secretariat submitted a review of the academic literature and concluded that "it is hard to take a fi rm line" on the issue because of the "complexity" of "the relationship between the level of a currency and trade [that] is so multi-faceted." 17 The secretariat implicitly signaled the diffi culty of prevailing in a WTO case.
The second pillar was considered more controversial and called for an institutional approach to examine how the "coherence mandate" between the WTO, IMF, and World Bank is being implemented regarding exchange rates. In explaining the second pillar, Brazil stressed the misalignment of the two regimes that "could create a no-man's-land preventing a much-needed debate on the interface between them." 18 Brazil did not wish the lack of alignment to preclude action. In the fall of 2011, Brazil became more direct and submitted a new proposal to the Working Group to examine the "available tools and trade remedies in the existing 16 19 Brazil appeared to be laying a foundation for taking trade action against countries' imports if the currency issue is not resolved. In November 2012, it explicitly stated that WTO members should start "analytical work" to consider new "exchange-rate trade remedies" given the gap in current WTO and IMF rules. 20 WTO members, however, did not endorse the Brazilian endeavor, and China "strongly objected" to it, maintaining that the WTO "is not the right forum to discuss exchange rate issues." 21 In October 2013, the Working Group shelved talks on the matter, although the issue of alignment remains . 22 In light of the failure of initiatives before the IMF and WTO, the handling of the issue of global imbalances and currency valuations shifted to attempts at political ordering through the G20, refl ecting the rise of emerging economies in global governance and a move away from international law and independent international institutions such as the IMF. The G20 launched a new process at its Pittsburgh summit in September 2009, entitled a Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth. Under the framework, members agreed to a multilateral Mutual Assessment Process, under which they identify objectives, policies to achieve them, and a peer review monitoring process. The G20 meets every couple of months, complemented by periodic teleconference calls. The process is country-driven, and the IMF participates within it as a technical third-party expert. Positions, however, continue to divide, for example, between the United States, which wants quantitative benchmarks and a peer review mechanism for assessing currency misalignment, and China, which resists constraints.
In 2012, U.S. politicians advocated negotiating these issues in plurilateral trade agreements, potentially giving rise to TLOs of variable geographic scope. They hoped to see provisions included in a new Transpacifi c Partnership agreement and a new U.S.-EU transatlantic free trade agreement (Bergsten & Gagnon 2012 ). The United States could then isolate and encircle China with new regional trade agreements, which could possibly build normative consensus toward the legitimacy of using trade measures on currency grounds. These developments refl ect a strategy of shifting the development of legal norms to new forums when they are blocked in multilateral ones. If successful, it would fragment the trade and monetary legal orders, further affecting their interface.
Signifi cant concerns thus remain regarding the asymmetries of enforcement between trade and monetary rules, as well as their lack of alignment. Some commentators advocate an amendment of the IMF Articles to adapt binding dispute settlement procedures under the IMF's auspices before neutral panels of experts on monetary issues (Blustein 2012 ) . Others advocate unilateral U.S. action in the form of import surcharges, such as the action the United States took in 1971 when it pulled out of the Bretton Woods system, in order to force a negotiated settlement of the issues and possible adaptations of relevant law (Bergsten & Gagnon 2012 ) . Ultimately, if the issue is to be addressed effectively through law, it will require better alignment of the trade and monetary legal orders .
Nonetheless, the existence of the two international organizations, combined with the perceived weakness of challenging currency "manipulation" under their respective rules, could be constraining, to some extent, unilateral trade restrictions that the United States and others might otherwise be pressed to impose against surplus countries such as China . Such sanctions, in turn, could lead to tit-for-tat retaliation and the unraveling of the trade legal order. IMF and WTO law and consultative procedures have thus arguably helped manage and contain the confl ict thus far and maintain some minimal order .
IV. Potential Conflict on Capital Controls and the Liberalization of Investment and Financial Services
It is widely recognized that there are trade-offs between fi nancial stability, on the one hand, and the removal of capital controls as part of the liberalization of fi nancial services to enhance effi ciency and spur investment and economic growth, on the other hand. States desire capital to facilitate economic development, and they may attempt to attract it by providing credible commitments through international agreements. Yet policymakers have long been concerned about the risks of "hot money " to national and global fi nancial stability . The original architects of the Bretton Woods system, in particular, were wary of unchecked capital fl ows and wished to retain room for states to address fi nancial instability and crises.
Starting in the 1990s, the United States and other developed countries, in support of their fi nancial sectors, pushed for two sets of agreements to liberalize capital fl ows -free trade in fi nancial services agreements and bilateral investment treaties. Free trade agreements in fi nancial services restrict governments' ability to constrain incoming portfolio investment fl ows in search of short-term returns. Bilateral investment treaties create liability for governments that restrict outgoing capital fl ows.
A. The Initial Bretton Woods System: Normative Settlement on Freedom to Impose Capital Controls
The economic case for capital account convertibility in general, and for portfolio investment liberalization in particular, has long appeared less compelling than the case for liberalized trade in goods (Bhagwati 1998 ) . At Bretton Woods, there was clear normative settlement about the desirability of national capital controls for macro-prudential reasons to prevent crises arising. Both Keynes and White believed that fl oating exchange arrangements, which prevailed during the interwar period, created speculative instability, to all countries' economic detriment (Steil 2013 : 138) . The original IMF Articles of Agreement thus prioritized currency stability over capital mobility, and they left untouched the ability of countries to regulate and restrict capital account transactions. More generally, there was consensus among professional economists regarding the desirability of capital controls (Chwieroth 2010 ) . Keynes and White were both suspicious of private capital fl ows. According to Keynes, "control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should be a permanent feature of the post-war system," a sentiment echoed by White, who thought "a good case could be made for . . . the [government's] power to control the infl ux and effl ux of capital" (Steil 2013 : 145) . U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau even rejoiced that the IMF was located at a distance from Wall Street and thus would "drive . . . the usurious money lenders from the temple of international fi nance" (Steil 2013 : 167) . Morgenthau and his fellow New Dealers wanted an international fi nancial system centered on the U.S. Treasury, rather than one in the hands of the private fi nanciers, either on Wall Street or in the City of London. The IMF Articles subject only current account transactions to the IMF's jurisdiction (such as those related to trade in goods), so IMF members are free to restrict all capital account transfers (such as portfolio investment), provided these restrictions do not unduly delay current transactions (IMF Article VI.3). The IMF may also support the use of capital account restrictions as part of an IMF fi nancing arrangement for a country facing balance-of-payments diffi culties. If approved by the IMF, restrictions on capital transfers may even be discriminatory. The Fund may even require countries to restrict capital account transfers, under Article IV, in cases where there are large and sustained outfl ows of capital, with a view to preventing the use of Fund resources for such transfers.
IMF members have agreed to coordinate and support each other's imposition of capital controls by providing automatic recognition by all IMF members of exchange restrictions imposed by any other member consistent with the IMF Articles (Gold 1982a ) . Article VIII.2(b) provides: " Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member" (emphasis added).
The meaning of Article VIII.2(b), however, never settled transnationally. English courts and U.S. courts, supported by some scholars, adopted a narrow defi nition that a contract is only subject to Article VIII.2(b) if it involves an agreement to exchange the currency of one country into the currency of another. French and German courts, in contrast, supported by other scholars, adopted a broader interpretation, holding that exchange contracts include any contracts that affect a country's exchange resources. In some of these cases, national courts seem to have taken into account that the stated primary object of the IMF Agreement was "to promote international monetary co-operation," and thus this objective could only be achieved if one interpreted "exchange contracts" to mean any contracts that have an effect on the fi nancial situation of a member or in any way affect the currency resources of a member.
The decisions of national courts to adopt one of these two interpretations, or those interpretations that fall between them, appeared to be infl uenced by the nation's position in the global economy. Rich countries that lend money to debtor countries risk jeopardizing the positions of their creditors if they follow the broader defi nition. This concern may explain the traditional narrow interpretation of the English and New York courts, supporting the interests of their fi nancial service providers, unlike courts in debtor countries that tended to adopt an expansive interpretation of the IMF Article, affecting the transnational settlement of the IMF legal norms across national jurisdictions .
B. Change in the United States and the Rise of a New TLO in Europe Guaranteeing the Free Flow of Capital
During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. offi cials reversed their views on capital controls . In 1972, the United States announced for the fi rst time at an IMF meeting that it opposed capital controls and would remove its own by the end of 1974. U.S. offi cials then led a movement to overturn Keynesian views toward capital controls in the IMF and abroad. In the 1990s, the United States targeted controls that particularly affected the U.S. fi nancial sector (Chwieroth 2010 : 146) . This shift of views in the United States would soon gain salience in Europe. During the late 1980s and the 1990s, a new regional TLO emerged in Europe that provided for the elimination of capital controls. The original Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) did not incorporate the free movement of capital, and EEC members imposed capital controls, including among each other. In 1986, however, they agreed under the Single European Act that the political bodies of the EEC could legislate regarding capital controls. The legislative bodies acted to require their removal. Under the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Union , the treaty itself prohibited capital controls.
Today, under Article 63 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) , which went into effect in 2009, EU member countries renounced the right to restrict capital movements at the national level, and such restriction applies erga omnes , that is, between member states and any third country, whether or not it is a member of the European Union. Henceforth, only the supranational European Council can limit capitals fl ows and then only in exceptional cases. The only limitations to the free movement of capital, subject to authorization by the Council, are on "public policy" and "public security" grounds and where capital movements threaten to cause "serious diffi culties for the operation of economic and monetary union" (TFEU Articles 65-66). In contrast to the IMF Articles or the OECD codes discussed below, the free movement of capital obligation has direct effect, and as a result, private parties may invoke it before national courts to enforce the treaty commitments.
23 As a result, transnational legal ordering within the European Union became institutionalized. Capital fl ows fl ourished, including to the poorer European countries running defi cits that are now most adversely affected by the Euro crisis.
As the European Union expanded to twenty-eight members, this regional TLO on capital controls expanded its geographic scope. Today, "the very defi nition of a 'European' state includes a commitment to capital mobility" (Abdelal 2007 : 83) The new candidate countries did not even request a transition period for liberalization, cementing the world's most liberal fi nancial system. As the Euro crisis hit, however, in part because of easy credit that fl owed into poorer European members (derogatorily denominated by The Economist as the PIGS -Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain), the potential desirability of capital controls became evident. In 2013, the European Council authorized their use in Cyprus, pursuant to a limited exception under the Treaty. The exception is only to apply for a six-month period, one that is likely unrealistic considering the circumstances .
C. The Multilateralization of Constraints on Capital Controls through the OECD, the WTO, and the IMF: A Push for Multilateral Alignment through Law
Capital account convertibility is crucial for cross-border investment and the provision of fi nancial services. The liberalization of fi nancial services straddles both current and capital account transactions, unlike the liberalization of goods and most other services transactions. Actors have pushed for a number of international initiatives that have legally constrained countries' ability to apply capital controls, whether broadly or specifi cally, in the fi nancial services sector.
Multilateralization of Free Capital Commitments through the OECD
After the European Union banned the use of capital controls by EU members in 1988, European countries took the initiative of expanding the TLO for free movement of capital to all developed countries through the OECD. At the time of the OECD's creation in 1961, OECD members widely used capital controls, and the OECD supported such use. However, in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell, in refl ection of a broad neo-liberal turn in policymaking and a push by European members exporting their own liberalization policies, OECD members embraced the freeing of transnational capital markets. They adopted the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the Code of Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations, pursuant to which OECD members waive their rights to apply capital controls except under limited situations to address emergencies and security threats. They further agreed to cooperate within a highly scrutinizing OECD system of peer review to ensure compliance with these commitments (Abdelal 2007 ) . Although derogations from this binding legal obligation are possible in cases of "serious economic and fi nancial disturbances," the OECD rules provide no explicit role for the IMF . Developing countries and their national service providers almost uniformly opposed the idea of fi nancial services liberalization, such that fi nancial sector liberalization was the most contested services sector in the Uruguay round negotiations.
In these negotiations, the traditional role and expertise of trade diplomats was not enough because of the delicate balances at stake involving regulatory policy space and the protection of fi nancial stability. Even though trade diplomats remained in control of the overall course of the negotiations, fi nance ministry offi cials negotiated the details (Dobson & Jacquet 1998 ) . Given their background in fi nance rather than trade, these offi cials were acquainted with the existing institutional arrangements, including not only the IMF but also the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and others (Bismuth 2010 ) . Finance offi cials from developed countries sought to preserve the prerogatives of these institutions, and, although supportive of fi nancial sector liberalization, they were concerned that the trade regime could eclipse domestic regulatory powers, particularly because trade law, rather than fi nance experts, dominated the WTO dispute settlement system (Lang 2011 ) .
Unlike with trade in goods under the GATT, liberalization of fi nancial services under the GATS is contingent on countries negotiating and undertaking specifi c commitments on market access in their GATS schedules. Developed countries generally did so, whereas developing countries were resistant, although some African countries and many newly acceding developing countries have made commitments. The Annex on Financial Services to the GATS adopts a specialized defi nition of services that defi nes "fi nancial service" broadly as "any service of a fi nancial nature offered by a fi nancial service supplier of a member." It provides a lengthy list of services that fall within this defi nition, which includes underwriting, traditional banking, and trading in almost every imaginable security. The promoters clearly intended to include as many activities as possible under the rubric of fi nancial services (von Bogdandy & Windsor 2008 ) .
GATS commitments open up capital infl ows, which, when there is a sudden turn in prospects, can lead to large outfl ows that destabilize an economy. They are thus of particular concern to policymakers who are wary of the impact of "hot money " on fi nancial stability . To preserve some autonomy for fi nancial regulators, the negotiators included a number of exceptions to countries' liberalization commitments that somewhat align the trade and monetary legal orders. GATS Article XI refers to rights under the IMF Articles so that capital controls can be used to safeguard balance of payments or upon the request of the IMF. 24 The Annex on Financial Services further entitles members to take measures for "prudential reasons," such as "to ensure the integrity and stability of the fi nancial system," provided that such measures "shall not be used as a means of avoiding the Member's commitments or obligations under the Agreement" (Article 2). The scope of the prudential exception is thus vague and unsatisfactory to those who are wary of the risks of rapid and massive capital infl ows and outfl ows .
Shifts in the IMF's Approach
During the 1990s, the IMF became increasingly receptive to the liberalization of global fi nance. IMF management and staff appeared to lead the charge as part of a neo-liberal ideological turn, despite resistance from some IMF membership, especially developing countries (Abdelal 2007 ) . First, the Second Amendment to the IMF Articles in 1978 partially constrained countries' seemingly unqualifi ed right to impose capital controls (under IMF Article VI) by extending the IMF's surveillance function (under Article IV) to address the implications of national measures for global fi nancial stability in a system without multilaterally fi xed exchange rates. In its surveillance and technical assistance, IMF staff advocated and spurred countries to liberalize their capital controls, as well as to adopt fi nancial standards and codes built largely from U.S. and UK models (Chwieroth 2010 ) .
In the mid-1990s, IMF management, supported by developed country members of the Executive Board, pushed for an amendment of the IMF Articles to grant the IMF explicit jurisdiction over capital account transactions. The Executive Board approved a mandate to work on a new amendment to promote a capital account liberalization through which countries' capital accounts would be progressively liberalized, just as their current accounts had been earlier (Fischer 1998 ) . The East Asian crisis of 1998 undermined these efforts. Developing countries opposed the IMF initiative almost en bloc. In September 1998, Malaysia banned all international capital transfers for one year to prevent contagion from the devaluation of the Thai baht. Its decision attracted considerable controversy, as it went against economic orthodoxy of the time, but the decision is now widely considered to have been a prudent measure (Kaplan & Rodrik 2001 ) . India and China continued to maintain limited openness in their capital account, and unlike many of their Asian peers, they were spared serious banking and fi nancial crises. The IMF quietly shelved its initiative and then altered its position over capital controls after being severely chastened for its handling of the crisis (Blustein 2003 ; 2012 ) .
D. The Challenges of Alignment with the Fragmentation of the Trade TLO
In parallel to multilateral initiatives through the OECD, WTO, and IMF, the United States and some countries in Europe, lobbied by their fi nancial sectors, became active in negotiating free trade and investment agreements that implicate the use of capital controls. Investment treaties can be viewed as a third TLO, but it is one that free trade agreements such as NAFTA have incorporated into the trade legal order, so the use of trade and investment agreements can be interchangeable. There are now more than 2,700 bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and more than 300 preferential trade agreements, of which many contain investment chapters. These agreements are extremely varied, creating a patchwork liberalization of capital accounts (Waibel 2009 ) . Free transfer clauses are a ubiquitous feature of modern BITs and, to a lesser degree, of free trade agreements (FTAs). Financial trade associations have played an important role in expanding the defi nition of investment under these agreements to cover portfolio investment and in ensuring that most BITs and FTAs include broad guarantees of free transfers with either limited or no exceptions.
BITs and FTAs with such clauses are misaligned (and possibly even in confl ict) with the monetary legal order when it comes to addressing fi nancial stability and fi nancial crises. Unlike the GATS, the clauses do not refer to the IMF Articles of Agreement, nor do they foresee any role for the IMF and its expertise in assessing whether capital account restrictions are justifi ed on balance-of-payments grounds. Although British and French BITs often include a balance-of-payments exception, they do not refer to the IMF or call for its testimony. German and U.S. BITs typically do not even contain a balance-of-payments exception (Waibel 2009 ) .
These BITs and FTAs also grant private rights to investors to enforce the commitments through investor-state arbitration, so host states become liable for compensation to investors when they impose transfer restrictions. Unlike expropriation or fair and equitable treatment, which protect individual investors against discriminatory and arbitrary treatment, free transfer clauses are not conditioned by being tied to discrimination or arbitrariness. The threat of such investment disputes can change the calculus of governments and chill the use of capital controls.
Investment treaties among developing countries, in contrast, explicitly attempt to align with existing IMF rules. For example, ASEAN member countries learned painful lessons in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998 , and these lessons are refl ected in the detailed exceptions to the free transfer provisions in the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement of (Desierto 2013 . The agreement contains extensive references to the IMF Articles in order to justify the imposition of capital controls.
In parallel, the IMF has somewhat warmed to the use of capital controls in light of the 1997 and 2008 fi nancial crises , such that the trade and monetary TLOs have come to be in tension with each other. In appropriate circumstances, the IMF now contends that capital controls may "provide breathing space while fundamental policy is adjusted" (IMF 2013, 18) . The fi rst country for which the IMF supported comprehensive capital controls following the 2008 fi nancial crisis was Iceland in order to stabilize the Icelandic currency and stem the loss of foreign reserves. The IMF has expressed concerns that BITs and FTAs "in many cases do not provide appropriate safeguards or proper sequencing of liberalization, and could thus benefi t from reform to include these protections" (IMF 2012, 8) .
The question looms as to how a potential confl ict between a transfer clause in a BIT and the IMF Articles will be resolved. Which order ought to prevail in the case of confl ict? In one international investment dispute, the arbitral tribunal in Continental Casualty v Argentine Republic confi rmed in obiter dicta that the more liberal free transfer clause in the US-Argentina BIT was lex specialis in relation to the IMF regime. Argentina had invoked the GATT, GATS, and the IMF Articles in support of its right to restrict transfers, whereas the Argentina-U.S. BIT was silent on the question. The tribunal, however, did not make a substantive ruling on the transfer in question other than to fi nd that it was not related to the investment and was therefore not covered. The general necessity defense under customary international law, and under clauses within BITs, might be interpreted to provide for alignment, but that will depend on determinations of ad hoc arbitral tribunals in light of the BIT in question.
Investors thus far have invoked free transfer clauses only rarely, and in no case has the provision played a central role in an arbitral tribunal's determination. For example, in Gruslin v. Malaysia ( 2000 ) , a Belgian investor brought an ICSID arbitration under the Belgo-Luxembourg-Malaysia BIT against Malaysia based on losses from his holding of US$2.3 million in a mutual fund registered in Luxembourg that, in turn, had purchased equities in Malaysia. Although the Gruslin tribunal dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on another ground, the arbitration directly raised the issue of potential confl icts between exchange restrictions and investment treaty obligations for the fi rst time.
With the fragmentation of the international trade and investment legal order because of FTAs and BITs, the interface of the trade and monetary TLOs over capital controls has become complex. Major developed countries use model BITs that, in aggregate, create new TLOs with variable geometry. The proliferation of these model BITs offers the possibility of forum shopping by investors who can operate through a web of subsidiary companies so that the most liberal ones become dominant in practice. These legal constraints on capital controls could limit both national and international prudential regulation in the interest of fi nancial stability , as well as national and international interventions to contain fi nancial crises. These trade and investment agreements thus are in tension and potentially confl ict with the existing monetary order. The alignment of the two legal areas raises major policy concerns in a world beset by a fi nancial recession that could worsen sharply and suddenly .
V. Why the Differences in Interface and Alignment?
Why do we see signifi cant TLO alignment and legal settlement in the balanceof-payments case, legal asymmetry and misalignment in the exchange rate case, and potential open confl ict in the capital controls case ? The explanations are a combination of functional, ideological, and power-based explanations, and in particular, they include the following: (1) choices among policy tradeoffs that have varied over time; (2) change in factual context, as countries have moved from a system of multilaterally fi xed exchange rates to a non-system of discretion over choice of exchange arrangements and new fi nancial instruments and technology have facilitated rapid and massive capital fl ows, so balance-of-payments issues have become less signifi cant for major economies and exchange rate and capital control policies have become more challenging; (3) functional ease of determination under the relevant legal rules, with balance-of-payment determinations being grounded in greater consensus over technocratic accounting assessments and the issue of currency manipulation involving the determination of a currency's baseline normal value, on which there is less consensus, as well as that of a country's subjective intentions, which are not measurable; (4) shifts in ideology over time that favored market ordering, with greater wariness of government intervention, affecting elite attitudes toward capital controls; (5) power, with challenges of trade restrictions introduced on balance-of-payments grounds brought before the WTO by developed countries against developing countries with less leverage, whereas the currency issue involves countries with large economies on both sides, such as the United States and China , both of which exercise signifi cant economic leverage; and (6) the signifi cant risks of labeling a country like China a "currency manipulator ," as advocated by some in the United States, in the current global economic context. These factors explain why the outcomes in the balance-of-payments , exchange rate , and capital control cases differ so signifi cantly.
First, a central reason for variation in the way the two legal orders have interfaced over our three issues is that the choice among macroeconomic policies to enhance national and global social welfare is not self-evident. As a result, the resolutions advanced tend to refl ect ideological predispositions and current policy priorities in response to events and recent experience. As theorists have long shown, international monetary policy faces a trilemma, in that fi xed (and thus stable) exchange rates cannot coexist with both an independent monetary policy and unrestricted (and thus theoretically more effi cient) capital movements (Irwin 2012 ) . A country is able to adopt any two of these three polices but not all three. Countries have attempted to resolve this trilemma in different ways, and individual countries have changed their approach over time in light of the constraints and opportunities provided by international monetary and trade rules. Up until the early and mid-1970s, all countries had fi xed exchange rates under the IMF par value system . As a result, all countries (other than the United States) lacked the ability to adopt an independent monetary policy once capital controls became porous or countries removed them. Under the Bretton Woods system , countries tended to restrict the movement of capital in order to uphold the par value of their currency, and the IMF Articles explicitly permitted them to do so. After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system , the major developed economies let their currencies fl oat or fl uctuate within a managed fl oat.
Second, the balance-of-payments provisions in the GATT were included, some say written by John Maynard Keynes himself, to refl ect a world of fi xed exchange rates under the Bretton Woods agreements. After the United States left the gold standard in 1971, the world's most important economies fl oated their currencies. Developing countries increasingly followed suit. Whereas almost three-quarters of developing countries pegged their currencies in 1982 , only 50 percent did so by 1991 (Eichengreen 2011 : 179) . As a result, a growing number of economically important countries had the option of devaluing their currencies when facing balance-ofpayment diffi culties , as opposed to raising trade barriers. For those countries with fl oating exchange rates, adjustment is automatic through supply and demand in the currency markets, curtailing the need to apply trade restrictions.
With currencies no longer pegged and adjusted within a multilateral system, a new challenge arose -that of potential currency manipulation to gain a trade advantage. This possibility, although long existing, became more politically salient when trade and fi nancial imbalances grew and politicians in the United States challenged China 's large interventions in currency markets and the steep rise of its trade surplus and exchange reserves. When the U.S. Federal Reserve responded to the shock experienced by the U.S. economy during the "great recession " with a policy of "quantitative easing ," the supply of U.S. dollars increased and the U.S. dollar exchange rate declined vis-à -vis other currencies, as did that of the yen following interventions by Japanese monetary authorities in 2013. Affected countries, such as Brazil , declared their fear of a "currency war," raising concerns in the IMF and WTO over protectionism and the implications for multilateral trade rules. In other words, as concerns over abuse of restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds declined, concerns regarding the challenge of currency misalignment and manipulation rose, refl ecting a shift from multilaterally fi xed exchange rates to multiple exchange arrangements that include fl oating and unilaterally pegged rates.
Third, the determination of whether a balance-of-payments crisis exists is technically easier, based on accepted accounting methodologies set forth in an IMF manual. The IMF keeps statistics pursuant to a Balance of Payments Manual that it revises periodically, and all IMF members are to keep BOP statistics in conformity with this manual. In contrast, currency manipulation involves both a complex accounting calculation that is subject to considerable contention because multiple factors affect the valuation of currencies and the issue of a country's intent. Determining the trade damages from currency misalignment , including the disentangling of cause and effect, would also be a major challenge for WTO panels and the Appellate Body (Staiger & Sykes 2010 ) . Countries have thus been unable to agree on clear and enforceable legal rules at the global level on macroeconomic and exchange rate policies since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system . Fourth, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall contributed to major ideological shifts in the 1990s toward reliance on markets as opposed to government intervention. Exchange rates fl oated and exchange markets burgeoned. "Hot money ," which had been a major concern of the architects of the Bretton Woods system, was viewed more favorably as a form of signaling and disciplining poor government policies. The freeing of capital controls was now seen as critical for the completion of the European internal market, as required for the status of being a "developed" country as an OECD member, and as investment capital in "emerging economies." Europe took the lead and others followed, with the IMF even proposing to amend its Articles to curtail countries' ability to use them. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis chagrined the IMF, but U.S. and European fi nancial services industries and governments pushed for greater constraints on governments to adopt capital controls, complemented by investor rights to enforce these constraints, through free trade agreements and bilateral investment treaties.
Fifth, with the rise of China and the fi nancial crisis striking the United States and Europe in 2008, there has been a signifi cant shift in global power, challenging U.S. and EU dominance in the trading and monetary legal orders (Amsden & Chu 2003 ; Zakaria 2008 ) . The combined GDP (in terms of purchasing power parity, PPP) of the United States and the European Union as a share of global GDP declined signifi cantly. In 1990, the two countries combined accounted for 49.7 percent of global GDP; by 2000, this amount was reduced slightly to 48.3 percent; but by 2010, it plunged to 37.8 percent of global GDP. The difference was largely taken up by the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (World Bank World Development Indicators). At the end of 2010, the BRICs constituted approximately 18 percent of the global economy in terms of GDP, compared to 8.3 percent in 2000 and 8 percent in 1990. In terms of its importance to the global economy, China alone accounted for 10 percent of global GDP (15 percent measured by PPP) and 9 percent of global trade, and these fi gures continue to rise (Subramanian 2011 , 80-87) .
Unlike in the balance-of-payments cases involving developing countries seeking fi nancing through the IMF, the IMF has no leverage over China , just as it has no leverage over large developed economies. Rather, China has considerable leverage over the IMF itself, as well as over the major Western economies. The IMF would like China to increase its contributions to enhance the ability of the IMF to act as a lender of last resort. Europe hopes for Chinese cooperation in resolving the Euro crisis, as well as potential country and bank bailouts. And the United States is dependent on China for the funding of the U.S. defi cit. Politically, the U.S. Treasury could shape the "rules of the game" as to how the IMF operated in the 1990s. With the rise of China and the IMF's backing off of China in light of the fi nancial crisis, U.S. power clearly have declined, as have the "rules of the game" regarding the trademonetary interface.
The currency issue has major distributive implications for each side. China is concerned about maintaining its export-oriented growth policies to ensure domestic growth and political stability as large numbers of Chinese move to urban areas. The United States and other countries are experiencing high unemployment, raising political tensions within them. Developing countries facing balance-of-payments crises also have major distributive concerns affecting social order. They, however, exercise little leverage in the law's shadow in balance-of-payments cases. Similarly, the choice of liberalization of capital controls through FTAs and BITs, as opposed to multilateral agreements, refl ects the leverage that the United States and Europe , supporting their fi nancial sectors, continue to wield in bilateral negotiations with smaller economies, in contrast to negotiations within multilateral institutions.
Sixth, the IMF and WTO are concerned that if China were formally declared a "currency manipulator ," it could lead to a wave of tit-for-tat protectionism. Countries might respond to such a declaration by raising barriers against Chinese imports, on the grounds that such responses are justifi ed by China's violation of IMF Article IV. Such actions could, in turn, justify countries taking actions against U.S., Japanese , and European exports because of quantitative easing policies. Such responses could pose major challenges for economic recovery across the globe in a frail economic context, raising risks analogous to those the world experienced with the beggar-thyneighbor policies of the 1930s.
Were the WTO dispute settlement system to actually hear a legal case and even authorize sanctions against countries that it fi nds deliberately intervene to undervalue their currency, it could trigger resistance to the WTO dispute settlement process itself, challenging its legitimacy. A WTO ruling would thus provide a partial solution at best and at worst fail to contribute to resolving the much larger issue of global imbalances. Were the WTO dispute settlement system to address this sensitive question, especially given that GATT rules drafted in the context of a system of multilaterally fi xed exchange rates are so poorly tailored to address the question, the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system could itself be called into question.
VI. Conclusion
In an economically interdependent world, trade and monetary policies in one country have signifi cant external effects on others. In times of crisis , these effects are dramatically felt, as shown by the Great Depression and the ensuing geopolitical confl icts. In the 1940s, the United States and the United Kingdom took the lead in creating new international institutions to address these issues through law. They created two distinct TLOs, one governing monetary affairs through the IMF and the other governing trade matters through the GATT.
During the fi rst twenty-fi ve years, these two TLOs aligned closely on all three issues that we have covered, resulting in considerable transnational settlement and institutionalization of legal norms. The IMF Articles fi xed exchange rates , subject to adjustments with the IMF's accord. The GATT bound tariffs and yet permitted them to be adjusted in the event that a currency's par value was adjusted consistently with the IMF's rules . Disputes were largely settled diplomatically, so political ordering remained important. Yet overall, nations largely complied with their commitments based on common understandings of obligations within relevant ministries whose offi cials engaged with each other through networks in which the IMF and GATT provided two complementary nodes.
With the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s, the monetary and trade TLOs' alignment became more challenging . Although there remains relatively clear normative settlement between international institutions and national policies regarding the use of trade restrictions on balance-of-payments grounds, there is no such settlement on the issue of exchange rates , and there is potential confl ict between the trade legal order and a much weaker monetary one on the issue of capital controls . The trading order has become more legalized under the WTO, but the IMF has become less so, rendering coordination diffi cult over the issue of exchange rates. The GATT rules were drafted in light of a Bretton Woods system of fi xed, but adjustable, exchange rates that no longer exists, rendering the use of GATT rules problematic. Actors have tried to interpret and amend existing IMF and WTO rules to address the exchange rate issue, but the law has largely receded as a tool for transnational ordering. This lack of alignment of the trade legal system and monetary non-system over exchange rates has curtailed the ability to sustain order through law .
In parallel, the IMF Articles provided that countries are free to impose capital controls (on the capital account), refl ecting the drafters' concerns over the risks of "hot money ." IMF members further agreed to coordinate to assist each other in enforcing each other's restrictions in respect of "exchange contracts." Yet the trade and monetary TLOs have become less aligned over the use of capital controls since the 1990s, and they are now are in potential confl ict . They have become so for a different reason, this time because of the fragmentation of trade and investment law. Private actors, working through developed country governments, have pushed for an array of bilateral and plurilateral agreements that require the elimination of capital controls, often with no exceptions to address prudential concerns or the challenges of containing a fi nancial crisis and with no reference to the IMF Articles. BITs and FTAs also grant legal rights to private parties to seek damages against the states imposing them, making both national and IMF multilateral intervention to constrain a fi nancial crisis more costly, and thus more diffi cult.
Because every transaction involving trade in goods or services also involves a fi nancial transfer (other than barter), the alignment of the trade and monetary TLOs is important for the effective legal ordering of the global economy . Where there is legal alignment of these two areas, trade negotiations, trade dispute settlement, and global economic exchange are facilitated . Where alignment is lacking, legal ordering becomes more diffi cult, despite the considerable legalization and judicialization of one of the two TLOs -the trade one. The lack of alignment, and even potential confl ict, on capital controls has become an important concern in light of the growth of technology and new fi nancial instruments that facilitate massive transnational exchange and risk triggering fi nancial contagion. The misalignment on exchange rates , in parallel, spurs demands for interventions to protect jobs and investments in nations at risk of, or beset by, economic recession, a situation that once again could have deleterious effects for all. Actors attempt to manage the issues politically but with no third-party arbiter to resolve disputes among them based on law. The experience of fi nancial contagion gave rise to the formation of the monetary and trade TLOs in the 1940s . The question becomes: Are these TLOs resilient and adaptable enough that they might be aligned to address the challenges of the day? Or, conversely, to what extent can political ordering through diplomacy substitute for weak legal ordering? Since the outbreak of the 2008 global fi nancial crisis, political leaders of the G20 countries have devoted enormous attention to the task of reforming the transnational public legal order governing prudential fi nancial regulation and supervision. Before the crisis, some of them may not even have been aware of the existence of this transnational fi nancial legal order (TFLO). 1 Its profi le even within the scholarly community has been much lower than those of other international legal orders. And yet, it has played a key role in recent years in infl uencing the behaviour of national (or regional, in the case of the European Union) fi nancial regulators and supervisors across the world, with the aim of promoting global fi nancial stability .
This chapter advances a number of arguments about the evolution of this order. The fi rst section highlights how the order has emerged since the 1970s, largely outside of the Bretton Woods legal and institutional framework that established the post-war global fi nancial order. The 1944 Bretton Woods conference focused on controls of cross-border fi nancial fl ows, whereas today's TFLO seeks to regulate and often harmonize domestic prudential regulation and supervision in the context of globally integrated fi nancial markets. In contrast to the hard law of Bretton Woods, the TFLO is also centred on international public soft law . In addition, the institutions at the core of the TFLO are not the two Bretton institutions -the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank -but rather the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and a number of network-based institutions that have been created since the 1970s .
The subsequent three sections of the chapter show how the emergence of the TFLO took place in a very incremental and piecemeal fashion across three phases, each of which was ushered in by a set of crises in globalizing fi nancial markets: the 1974 and 1982 international banking crises; the 1994 and 1997-1998 emerging market
